QUICKLOOK: What is the operational reach of JNIM and ISSP into the coastal borderlands of Benin, Togo,and Ghana?

by Analyst, Joe O. 

Bottom Line Up Front

JNIM has established operational reach into northern Benin and Togo and likely retains the capability to probe Ghana’s northern borderlands, though no confirmed attacks have occurred inside Ghana during the reporting window. ISSP does not currently present a coastal threat. ACLED data and recent attack reporting indicate that JNIM activity has expanded southward along Burkina Faso’s border corridors into Benin and Togo, suggesting a deliberate or opportunistic effort to widen operational space without attempting territorial seizure. Ghana’s proximity to these active militant zones, combined with increased northern military deployments, indicates elevated spillover risk despite the absence of recorded incidents. In contrast, ISSP activity remains concentrated in Niger and eastern Sahel theaters, with no measurable operational exposure in coastal states during the same period.

What We've Observed

JNIM Central Mali Tempo (Core Zone Mopti / Gourma axis)

In January–February 2026, JNIM sustained a high operational tempo across central and western Mali through coordinated ambush and interdiction attacks. On 13 February, the group conducted a confirmed ambush near Hombori (Mopti Region) targeting FAMa, with imagery indicating destroyed or disabled military vehicles and reported personnel losses.

In late January 2026, JNIM claimed responsibility for attacking a joint Malian Army–Russian Africa Corps convoy between Douentza and Boni. JNIM follow-up imagery showed captured AK-pattern rifles, 7.62mm ammunition, motorcycles, and additional light weapons, reinforcing the pattern of battlefield sustainment through seizure.

Separately, in late January 2026 JNIM targeted a fuel tanker convoy between Kayes and Diboli near the Senegalese border, with subsequent footage showing JNIM fighters preventing civilian looting, while indications suggest possible damage to FAMa vehicles.

JNIM Activity in (Benin, Togo, and Ghana)

ACLED conflict exposure data (Feb 2025 – Feb 2026) records 71 JNIM-linked political violence events in Benin, with approximately 290,000 population exposure. Events cluster in northern departments bordering Burkina Faso rather than coastal urban centers. On 17 April 2025, JNIM conducted a coordinated double attack targeting military positions at Point Triple and Chutes de Koudou in W National Park, killing at least 54 Beninese soldiers. This was the deadliest single day of conflict in Benin since militant activity began spreading into the country in 2019.

Benin

ACLED conflict exposure data (Feb 2025 – Feb 2026) records five JNIM-linked political violence events in Togo, with approximately 21,000 population exposure. Events are concentrated in the Savannes region bordering Burkina Faso. JNIM militants are suspected of launching a suicide drone attack on a Togolese military position in Djignandjoaga on 9 April. This incident aligns with broader reporting that JNIM has expanded its tactical repertoire in coastal border zones, incorporating rockets, directed explosive charges, drones, and IED ambushes against camps, convoys, and patrols. Regional security reporting consistently frames northern Togo as experiencing cross-border incursions originating from southern Burkina Faso.

Togo

ACLED records no JNIM-linked political violence events in Ghana during the (February 2025 – February 2026) reporting window. However, JNIM activity is present in adjacent northern Togo (Savannes region) and southern Burkina Faso border districts during the same period, placing active militant zones immediately north and northeast of Ghana’s Upper East and Upper West regions. Ghana has increased military deployments and border patrols in northern regions bordering Burkina Faso, reflecting official concern about cross-border militant infiltration.

Ghana

Ghanaian authorities have publicly acknowledged the risk of spillover from Burkina Faso and Togo, particularly through forested and lightly governed border corridors. Ghana’s informal gold sector and illicit trade networks are other potential areas of vulnerability. JNIM groups operating in southern Burkina Faso have historically leveraged smuggling routes, local grievances, and economic exploitation zones to facilitate movement and recruitment in neighboring states. While no confirmed JNIM attack has occurred inside Ghana during the reporting window, the group’s presence directly across the border likely suggests Ghana remains within its potential operating depth.

JNIM Operational Capabilities

Recent attacks have targeted military convoys and fixed positions, not exclusively rural patrols. JNIM continues to employ recurring IED and ambush tactics, with occasional reference to drone observation or limited drone employment. JNIM has also captured regional force equipment, including light armored vehicles and various weapon systems. On 4 April 2025, imagery showed a downed quadcopter assessed to be a commercial off-the-shelf platform modified to carry a 60mm mortar round fitted with a UT-M57 fuze adapted for aerial deployment.

ISSP Operational Reach

ISSP operational exposure remains concentrated particularly in Niger, as well as eastern Mali and core Sahel belts, with no recorded ISSP exposure in Benin, Togo, or Ghana in ACLED data from 2025. Recent activity reflects this geographic containment. In early February 2026, ISSP claimed responsibility for an attack targeting Niamey International Airport and the 101st Air Force Base, striking hangars and military assets adjacent to a major civilian aviation hub. Earlier in January 2026, ISSP carried out a massacre in the Yatakala/Bossoye area of Tillabéri Region, killing approximately 31 civilians. These incidents reinforce a pattern of ISSP activity centered on Niger, targeting both military infrastructure and civilian populations, with limited evidence of coastal state expansion.

Why this matters?

JNIM’s demonstrated ability to sustain high-tempo operations in central Mali while projecting violence into northern Benin and Togo materially increases pressure on coastal security architectures. The group is not attempting territorial seizure in littoral states, but rather expanding operational space through ambushes, infrastructure interdiction, and selective high-casualty attacks. This approach strains border forces, compels costly force redistribution, and raises the risk of cross-border spillover into Ghana’s northern districts. The pattern suggests JNIM has the capacity to escalate episodically without overextending, maintaining initiative while forcing coastal governments into a reactive posture.

The divergence between JNIM and ISSP trajectories is operationally significant. JNIM is consolidating control in core Sahel zones while deliberately widening its southern arc toward coastal West Africa, whereas ISSP remains concentrated in Niger and eastern Sahel theaters. This creates a differentiated threat environment: coastal states face expansionary pressure primarily from JNIM networks operating along Burkina Faso border corridors, not from ISSP. Over time, sustained cross-border probing and infrastructure attacks risk normalizing militant presence in northern coastal borderlands, gradually eroding state control without a formal declaration of territorial governance.

What's next?

JNIM is likely to continue controlled southward expansion while maintaining pressure in central Mali, prioritizing cross-border ambushes, infrastructure interdiction, and selective high-visibility attacks in northern Benin and Togo. Rather than attempting territorial seizure in coastal states, the group is likely to pursue destabilization designed to stretch security forces, disrupt trade corridors, and undermine public confidence in border governance. Ghana remains a probable probing target given its proximity to active militant zones. ISSP, by contrast, is likely to remain operationally concentrated in Niger and eastern Sahel theaters, reinforcing the bifurcation of threat streams between Sahel-core and coastal border fronts.

Key signals include:

• Increased frequency of coordinated cross-border attacks originating from Burkina Faso into Benin or Togo;
• Evidence of JNIM logistics nodes or facilitation networks inside coastal territory; 
• Expanded use of drones, suicide IEDs, or complex assaults in littoral border regions; and shifts in messaging framing coastal states as priority fronts.

On the state side, indicators of strain would include expanded emergency powers, prolonged northern region curfews, significant troop reallocations from southern population centers, or increased reliance on external security assistance. Russian security engagement expanding southward beyond Mali, or conversely deeper Western ISR support, training, and rapid reaction deployments along the coastal belt, would signal intensifying influence competition linked to the emerging containment dynamic.

ENDS.