QUICKLOOK: Starlink's evolving role in the Russo-Ukraine War

Bottom Line Up Front

Ukraine's whitelist system has disrupted Russian Starlink access, with early signs of battlefield impact. But the episode exposes a deeper vulnerability - both sides depend on a single commercial actor for critical military functions.

What We've Observed

Starlink's Role in Ukrainian Operations

Starlink has become central to Ukrainian military and civilian resilience since February 2022. After Russia disabled the communications infrastructure at the outset of the invasion, Elon Musk offered Starlink services to Ukraine via X. The system enabled rapid restoration of communications in contested areas where terrestrial infrastructure had been destroyed.

Starlink's terminals were relatively easy to set up, becoming operational in under 15 minutes. By May 2022, more than 150,000 Ukrainians were using Starlink daily. Minister Fedorov described it as "crucial support for Ukraine's infrastructure and the restoration of destroyed territories." Other commanders share this view, claiming that without Starlink, the war could have been lost.

Starlink Supported:

Tactical Communications

• Battlefield command and control.
• Coordination of forces and isolated units (e.g., Azovstal defenders).
• High-speed data sharing for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).

ISR and Targeting

• Rapid data collection and dissemination.
• Transmission of drone-collected intelligence to artillery units for precision firing.
• Reduction of target detection-to-engagement timelines to 30 minutes or less.

UAV Operations

• Remote operation of reconnaissance and strike drones.
• Shift from large UAVs (e.g., Bayraktar) to smaller commercial drones.
• Maritime drone operations in the Black Sea.

Civilian and Emergency Services

Emergency services and humanitarian communication in rural or conflict zones. Civilian warning systems and emergency coordination. Societal cohesion and social resilience under wartime conditions.

Tension and Restriction

Starlink's expanding military use created friction with SpaceX. The company expressed concern about escalation if the system were used for offensive operations. Geofencing restrictions and a refusal to extend service for certain operations, including a planned naval drone strike in Crimea, exposed the operational risks of relying on a privately controlled network. After Musk raised concerns about sustaining free wartime access, U.S. intervention led to a formal Department of Defense contract in 2023. This stabilized service and aligned its use with U.S. national security objectives.

Starlink's Role in Russian Operations

Despite U.S. sanctions preventing official purchases, Russia acquired and employed thousands of Starlink terminals in its operations.

At the outset of the invasion, Russia's PGMs were limited, untested, and reliant on degraded GNSS systems. Early precision strikes frequently failed or missed intended targets. Sanctions further strained Russia's guided weapons program and GLONASS system.

Starlink supplemented these shortfalls.

Reports of Russian Starlink use surfaced in February 2024. By September 2024, reports indicated Russian Shahed drones were equipped with Starlink antennas. In December 2025, the modified Russian Molniya-2 drone was also reported to be equipped with Starlink components, extending its operational range from 30 km to 230 km. Other models were reportedly controllable from up to 500 km away.

These modifications increased risks to Ukrainian supply routes. Civilian vehicles have also been attacked by drones equipped with Starlink receivers.

How Russia Obtained Terminals

Ukrainian officials assess that Russia acquired terminals through third-party suppliers and battlefield capture.

Serhiy Beskrestnov, adviser to Ukraine's defense minister, adds that Russian operatives offered cash to civilians in Ukrainian-controlled territory in exchange for registering Starlink terminals in their names. These terminals operate only within Ukrainian territory near the front lines, challenging geofencing operations.

On February 17, 2026, Lieutenant General Valery Tishkov acknowledged that Russian units were using Starlink terminals on the frontline, though he described their use as limited to "individual" Russian units who were using the terminals and "primarily to mislead Ukrainian forces."

Ukrainian Whitelist System

Ukraine introduced a "white list" requiring all terminals to be verified and registered to remain operational. Civilians and businesses can register through service points or online portals. Military units use a separate process.

Musk stated on X: "Looks like the steps we took to stop the unauthorized use of Starlink by Russia have worked."

Why This Matters

The whitelist system allows Ukraine to identify and disable unregistered terminals. Russian drone operations dependent on unauthorized Starlink access may face significant disruption.

Parallel to the implementation of whitelisting, Ukrainian forces have made notable territorial gains along the front. President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces have liberated 300 square kilometers across an unspecified area of southern Ukraine, while the ISW assesses gains of at least 168.9 square kilometers since January 1, 2026. These counteroffensives likely complicated Russian preparations for a summer offensive toward Orikhiv and Zaporizhzhia City from the east.

The precise role of whitelisting in these advances remains unconfirmed. In a February 20 interview with AFP, Zelensky suggested Ukrainian forces were "taking advantage" of the connectivity disruptions. However, direct empirical evidence linking whitelist enforcement to battlefield outcomes is limited. It is likely that whitelisting was one of several contributing factors rather than a singular cause.

This episode highlights a broader strategic issue in the Russo-Ukrainian war: both actors depend on a privately controlled satellite network for key military functions. Decisions made by a commercial actor have directly shaped battlefield outcomes.

What's Next

The recent loss of Starlink is affecting Russian operations for now, but Russian forces will likely adapt and find alternative solutions.

Russia is reportedly testing a stratospheric communications platform as a potential alternative. On February 12, the Russian Foundation for Advanced Research Projects claimed it conducted the maiden flight of the Barrage-1 unmanned stratospheric platform capable of carrying 5G Non-Terrestrial Network communications equipment. Currently, the efficacy of this system remains questionable.

Drones not dependent on Starlink remain operational and continue to be used in combat, employing alternative methods to extend their effective range. Russian forces are reportedly installing antennas and signal amplifiers in central Myrnohrad to strengthen drone connectivity. Additionally, pro-Ukrainian hacker groups report that Russian forces have used civilian infrastructure in Belarus, including cellular towers, to establish routing pathways and maintain stable signals for drone strikes against targets in northern and western Ukraine.

Indicators to Watch

Renewed reporting of Russian drones or UAVs previously linked to Starlink connectivity (e.g., Molniya-2 or Shahed variants) operating at extended ranges (200-500 km). Suspicious location or usage of personal and commercially registered Starlink terminals. Increased third-party procurement activity, particularly bulk purchases of Starlink systems in neighboring or intermediary countries. Evidence of technical modification of terminals suggesting attempts to bypass geofencing or authentication requirements. Repeated cases of Russian operatives coercing or fraudulently using Ukrainian civilians to bypass whitelisting registration requirements. Sudden improvement in Russian drone efficiency without a clear substitute/alternative system replacing Starlink.

Recommendations

Governments should establish mechanisms to monitor and regulate the international procurement and transfer of dual-use commercial space systems such as Starlink. The Russian acquisition of terminals through third-party suppliers and civilian registration schemes demonstrates how commercial distribution channels can be exploited in wartime. Stricter export controls and closer coordination between providers and governments could reduce adversarial acquisitions without major detriment to legitimate commercial use.

Commercial space systems such as Starlink offer significant military advantages by providing rapid, high-bandwidth communications and ISR capabilities without requiring the time, cost, and industrial base necessary to build a domestic equivalent. However, reliance on a privately controlled network introduces strategic risk as demonstrated by both Ukrainian and Russian connectivity shutouts. National security functions should not depend on informal arrangements or assumptions of alignment.

States seeking to integrate commercial satellite systems into military operations should establish preemptive, formal agreements. These agreements should clearly define authorized military use cases, geographic and operational parameters, continuity of service agreements, and dispute resolution systems in case of conflict or escalation. Contingency planning is also important. In the case of a commercial provider failing to meet expectations or attempting to alter access/terms during a crisis or conflict, alternative pathways must already be in place.

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